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1.	Introduction

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way in virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in section 3.    


2.	Memory and intentional object

It is hard to decide which approach to take towards the question of what the intentional objects of memory are without knowing, first, what type of memory we are enquiring about and, second, what counts as an intentional object for the purposes of our inquiry. It is worth specifying the two issues since, for all we know, it may turn out that different types of memory happen to have different types of entities as their intentional objects. Let us start, therefore, by distinguishing some varieties of memory.

A useful distinction in the psychological literature is that between ‘episodic’ and ‘semantic’ memory.​[1]​ Remembering something semantically is a matter of having a belief with a certain causal history. If a subject semantically remembers something, then they believe it, and they believe it because they formed their belief at some point in the past, and their belief has been preserved until now. With the term ‘semantic memory’, we refer to the faculty that allows a subject to preserve their beliefs over time. (Derivatively, we may also refer to those beliefs which have been preserved by the faculty of semantic memory as ‘semantic memories’.) If I remember that Columbus arrived to America in 1492, for example, then I remember it semantically: I believe that he did, and I believe that he did because I formed that belief during some history lesson in the past, and because my belief has been preserved until now. Remembering something episodically, on the other hand, consists in having an experience which involves some kind of imagery and originates in a past perceptual, introspective or agentive experience of the remembering subject. If I episodically remember that I left my house keys in the door, for example, then I undergo an experience wherein my keys are presented to me as having ben in the door, and I have that experience because, at some point in the past, I seemed to perceive that the keys were in the door. With the term ‘episodic memory’, we can refer both to the faculty that allows a subject to generate such experiences, and to the experiences delivered by the faculty. 

The key characteristic of episodic and semantic memory, as far as their intentionality is concerned, is that the two faculties deliver states that have the capacity to be true, accurate or correct. We can think of the intentional object of a memory, then, as what it takes for the memory to be correct. It will be that object, event, action or state of affairs whose presence makes the memory correct and whose absence makes it incorrect. We specify the intentional object of a memory, then, by specifying its truth conditions. With this notion of intentional object in mind, the question regarding the intentional objects of semantic memory is relatively easy to answer: If you remember something semantically, then the object of your memory is the object of your belief, that is, whatever you believe. Since beliefs are propositional attitudes, it seems that those things which you remember semantically will always be propositions, that is, states of affairs of some kind.​[2]​ The precise kind will simply depend on the subject matter of your past belief in each case. Suppose, for example, that on Monday you believe that the painful sensation in your stomach is intense and, on Thursday, you remember that you felt an intense painful sensation in your stomach because, on Monday, you formed that belief and your belief has been preserved until Thursday. Then, the remembered state of affairs is not mind-independent, since it involves a sensation: It is the fact that you felt an intense painful sensation in your stomach. By contrast, in the Columbus case, the remembered state of affairs is clearly mind-independent.​[3]​

The question about the intentional objects of episodic memory is the hard and interesting question to answer. We speak of episodic memories as if they were directed at either states of affairs, actions, events or objects. Thus, we express episodic memories with expressions of the form ‘I remember that p’ (where ‘p’ stands for a state of affairs, as in ‘I remember that the house keys were in the door’), ‘I remember -ing’ (where ‘’ stands for an action, as in ‘I remember inserting the keys in the door’), and ‘I remember x’ (where ‘x’ stands for an object or an event, as in ‘I remember the house keys’ and ‘I remember the sale of my house’ respectively). I take episodically remembering to be a propositional attitude. Thus, I take the case where episodically remembering is an attitude towards a state of affairs to be the basic case. In what follows, I will assume, accordingly, that episodically remembering objects, episodically remembering events and episodically remembering actions should be construed as remembering certain states of affairs that involve those objects, events and actions to have obtained. Thus, I will take expressions of the form ‘S remembers -ing’ and ‘S remembers x’ to abbreviate, respectively, that S remembers that she -ed, and that S remembers that S was in some (contextually salient) relation to x. 

There are alternative approaches, to be sure. One might take episodically remembering to be, in the first instance, an attitude towards an event and, derivatively, an attitude towards a proposition; the proposition that the event at issue had this or that property. The advantage of the propositional approach over the events-based approach is that, on the propositional approach, it is easy to accommodate the intuition that episodic memories have truth conditions; conditions under which they may be right or wrong. For those conditions can be captured by a proposition straightforwardly. On the events-based approach, by contrast, it is not easy to accommodate that intuition, since events are not bearers of either truth or falsity. On the events-based approach, it may make more sense to claim that episodic memories do not have truth conditions and, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a false, or incorrect, episodic memory. I, however, will be assuming that misremembering episodically is still remembering; hence my preference for the propositional approach.​[4]​  

If the propositional approach is correct, then it seems that, similarly to the case of semantic memory, the objects of our episodic memories are states of affairs of some kind. One might wonder, though, what kind that is exactly. Are episodically remembered states of affairs always worldly states of affairs? Are they always mental states of affairs? We have seen that, in the case of semantic memory, remembered states of affairs do not need to belong to a single kind. Each time we remember something semantically, one of our past beliefs plays the role of determining which state of affairs we are remembering, and that belief may sometimes be about a mental state of affairs, and sometimes be about a worldly state of affairs. Analogously, each time we remember something episodically, our past (typically perceptual) experiences seem to play the parallel role of determining which state of affairs we are remembering. But, as we are about to see, the role that past experiences play in episodic memory is harder to specify than that of beliefs in semantic memory. And, for that reason, it is not straightforward whether episodically remembered states of affairs need to belong to a single kind or not. 

There is a certain disanalogy between the role of past belief in determining the intentional object of a corresponding semantic memory and the role of past perceptual experience in determining the intentional object of a corresponding episodic memory. In the case of episodic memory, there is room for drawing a distinction between a direct and an indirect contribution that the past perceptual experience is making. One might argue that, directly, the past perceptual experience determines the intentional object of the episodic memory in which it originates in that the fact that the subject had that perceptual experience in the past is the immediate intentional object of the memory. But, one might add, the past perceptual experience also determines the intentional object of the episodic memory indirectly: In virtue of the fact that the subject’s past perceptual experience was about some state of affairs, the seemingly perceived past state of affairs is also the intentional object of the memory, although in a mediated way. The distinction between the two types of contribution that past perceptual experience makes in determining the intentional object of episodic memories opens up a certain position about the question of whether episodically remembered states of affairs are worldly states of affairs or mental states of affairs. It allows us to take the position that the question at issue is a false dichotomy: The option that both types of states of affairs are the intentional objects of episodic memories at the same time, one might claim, has been neglected. 

In the case of semantic memory, by contrast, there seems to be no room for a distinction between two types of contribution that past belief makes in determining the intentional object of a semantic memory. It does not seem that, when we learn some fact in the past and we now remember it semantically, there is some sense in which our semantic memory is about the belief that we formed in the past during the learning episode. If, for example, at some point in the past I learnt that Columbus arrived to America in 1492, and I now remember that fact, it does not seem that my current belief is about the belief that I formed in the past, when I learnt that fact. What I believe, when I semantically remember, seems to be something about Columbus. There seems to be only one type of contribution that the belief I formed in the past, when I learnt about Columbus, is making in determining the intentional object of my semantic memory: Whatever I learnt about Columbus constitutes the intentional object of my semantic memory.

Now, if things are not as straightforward in the episodic memory case as they are in the semantic memory case, then should we not take the possibility that both worldly states of affairs and mental states of affairs may be the intentional objects of episodic memories at the same time seriously? In what follows, I will remain neutral on whether episodic memories can indeed have intentional objects in the mediated way sketched above. For the purposes of our discussion here, the intentional objects of episodic memory will be conceived as their immediate intentional objects. (Those may be their only intentional objects or not, depending on whether an account of what it is for a state of affairs to constitute the intentional object of an episodic memory in a mediated way can be worked out in detail.) Let us consider, next, the significance of specifying this type of intentional objects for episodic memory.   

3.	The phenomenology and epistemology of episodic memory

In addition to being intentional states, our episodic memories are mental states that enjoy distinctive features of two kinds. Episodic memories have, firstly, a characteristic phenomenology. There are, in other words, some phenomenal features that episodic memories typically enjoy or, equivalently, some feelings that they normally elicit in the remembering subject. Secondly, episodic memories afford a special knowledge of some domains. That is, we can acquire, in virtue of having episodic memories, knowledge of certain areas of reality that is unlike the knowledge of those areas which we can acquire through other means. Let us consider these two sets of features of episodic memories in order.

In order to highlight two characteristic phenomenal features of episodic memory, it may be useful to contrast episodic memory with some of our other faculties. One way in which episodic memory differs, for example, from perception and introspection is that remembered states of affairs appear to us to be in the past. By contrast, perceived states of affairs do not appear to us to be in the past, and introspected states of affairs do not appear to us to be in the past either. When we have a perceptual experience, it feels to us as if the perceived state of affairs obtains in the present.​[5]​ Likewise, when we undergo an episode of introspection, it feels to us as if the introspected state of affairs is obtaining in the present. However, in virtue of having an episodic memory, the state of affairs that we are remembering appears to us to have been the case in the past. Let us call this feature of episodic memory, a ‘feeling of pastness’. One way in which episodic memory is, however, similar to introspection concerns our own past experience. Suppose that we introspect a mental state with some phenomenal features, such as a sensation, an emotion or a perceptual experience. Then, in virtue of undergoing that episode of introspection, we are aware of what it is like to occupy the introspected mental state. Likewise, when we have an episodic memory, we become aware of what it was like to experience a certain state of affairs; a state of affairs in the past. We can call this feature of episodic memory, a ‘feeling of past experience’.  

A comparison with perception and introspection is also useful to highlight two of the characteristic epistemic features of memory. One way in which episodic memory is epistemically special is that it provides us with evidence, or grounds, for forming beliefs about the past, in an analogous way to that in which perception provides us with evidence for forming beliefs about the present. Episodic memories seem to put us in a position to form beliefs about the past that is, in a certain sense, immediate. It seems that, in virtue of having an episodic memory, we have evidence for believing that some state of affairs happened in the past without the need to perform any inference. Just like perception allows us to form perceptual beliefs by taking our perceptual experiences at face value, it seems that episodic memory allows us to form beliefs about the past by taking our episodic memories at face value. To that extent, it seems that episodic memory puts us in direct cognitive contact with the past. Let us call this epistemic feature of episodic memory the ‘immediacy of the past’. A different way in which episodic memory is epistemically special is that it provides us with evidence, or grounds, for forming beliefs about our own past experience, in an analogous way to that in which introspection provides us with evidence for forming beliefs about our present experience. Episodic memories seem to put us in a position to form beliefs about our past experience non-inferentially. By simply taking our episodic memories at face value, we can form beliefs about what our own experience was like at certain moments in the past. Let us call this epistemic feature of episodic memory the ‘immediacy of past experience’.
The significance of an investigation of the intentional objects of episodic memory lies in its potential to illuminate the phenomenology and epistemology of episodic memory. Suppose that the intentional objects of our episodic memories involved the past as well as our own experience. Suppose, that is, that our episodic memories were, ultimately, about those two domains. Then, it would make sense that our episodic memories enjoyed a feeling of pastness and a feeling of past experience. The thought would be that the feeling of pastness and the feeling of past experience is the way in which the intentional objects of episodic memory are presented to us; the way in which we experience what our memories are about.​[6]​ Similarly, it would make sense that our episodic memories enjoyed the features of immediacy of the past and immediacy of past experience. The thought would be that, when we take our episodic memories at face value, we are simply trusting what they convey to us. If it turned out that the intentional objects of our episodic memories involved the past state of the world, and they also involved our own past experience, then this would mean that our memories convey information about those two domains. It would not be surprising, then, that we are in a position to form beliefs about those two domains non-inferentially in virtue of having episodic memories. 

The devil, however, is in the details. For different ways of specifying the precise involvement of the past and that of our own experience in the intentional objects of our episodic memories will illuminate the epistemic and phenomenal features of those memories with varying degrees of success. Let us turn, therefore, to some of the candidates for the intentional objects of episodic memory.

4.	Mind and world in episodic memory

Consider the following possible situation. I am looking at the door of my house, and my perceptual experience presents my house keys to me as being in the door. Minutes later, I have an episodic memory that originates in that perceptual experience; an episodic memory that I would express by saying that I remember my house keys being in the door. Let us call this possible situation ‘W0’, and let us call my past perceptual experience and my episodic memory in W0, ‘P’ and ‘M’ respectively. How should we conceive the intentional object of M? Let us assume, for the sake of convenience, that propositions are identical with sets of possible worlds. Then, the following two propositions spring to mind as candidates for being the intentional object of M:   

OBJ: 	{W: In W, my house keys were in the door}
SUBJ: 	{W: In W, I had P}

If the intentional object of M is OBJ, then I remember something that is mind-independent; something that was the case independently of my mental states at the time. Accordingly, let us call the proposal according to which OBJ is the intentional object of M, the ‘objective proposal’.  By contrast, if the intentional object of M is SUBJ, then I remember something that is not mind-independent; something that would not have been the case had some of my mental states been different.​[7]​ Let us call, then, the proposal according to which SUBJ is the intentional object of M, the ‘subjective proposal’. What are the virtues and shortcomings of these two proposals, and what do those shortcomings teach us about the intentional objects of episodic memory?

The objective proposal performs quite well with regards to the feeling of pastness and the immediacy of the past. If the objective proposal is correct, then M is about a past objective state of affairs, namely, my house keys having been in the door. It is not surprising, then, that I have a sense that, in the past, my house keys were in the door when I have M. After all, the fact that my house keys were there in the past is simply what I am remembering if the proposal is correct. For the same reason, it is also no wonder that M allows me to form the belief that a certain state of affairs was the case in the past (namely, my house keys having been in the door) without performing any inference. For if the objective proposal is correct, then what I am doing by forming such a belief is simply accepting what I remember. That is, I am just assenting to the information conveyed to me by my memory. The trouble for the objective proposal concerns the feeling of past experience and the immediacy of past experience. The fact that, in virtue of having M, I become aware of what it was like for me to perceive my house keys at some point in the past seems odd if the objective proposal is correct. After all, what I remember, if the proposal is correct, is my house keys; not my past perceptual experiences. For the same reason, it seems odd that, in virtue of having M, I seem to be in a position to form a belief about what my perceptual experiences were like when I looked at the door of my house without performing any inference. If what I remember are my house keys, and not my past perceptual experiences, then it is hard to see what the source of information that I am utilising to form such a belief is. Thus, the objective proposal seems to be capable of illuminating the feeling of pastness and the immediacy of the past, but the feeling of past experience and the immediacy of past experience seem to raise some difficulties for the proposal.  

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the converse virtues and shortcomings apply to the subjective proposal. If the subjective proposal is correct, then M is about a perceptual experience of mine. The experience in question is P; a past perceptual experience wherein my house keys appeared to me to be in the door. It is not surprising, then, that having M makes me aware of what it was like to perceptually experience my house keys in the door. After all, if the subjective proposal is correct, then having P is, strictly speaking, what I remember by having M. And how could I episodically remember having P without remembering what it was like for me to have that experience? For the same reason, it is also no wonder that M allows me to form a belief about what my perceptual experience was like in the past without performing any inference. After all, if what I remember is my past perceptual experience P, then one would expect me to be in a position to form beliefs about that perceptual experience and, in particular, beliefs about what it was like for me to have it. The trouble for the subjective proposal involves the feeling of pastness and the immediacy of the past. The fact that, in virtue of having M, I become aware of my house keys having been in the door seems odd if the subjective proposal is correct. Notice that what I remember, if the proposal is correct, is my past perceptual experience of the keys P; not the keys themselves. Why would my memory, then, convey the feeling that, in the past, the state of the world involved my house keys being in the door? If the subjective proposal is correct, then such a phenomenology goes beyond the experience of that which I remember. For the same reason, it is hard to see how M could put me in a position to form the belief that the house keys were in the door without performing any inference. If what I remember, strictly speaking, is my past perceptual experience of the keys P, then it seems that, in order to arrive at the belief that the house keys were in the door, I do need to perform an inference; an inference from the belief that, by having P, I seemed to perceive the house keys in the door, and the belief that my past perceptual experience P was trustworthy. It seems, therefore, that the subjective proposal can shed some light on the feeling of past experience and the immediacy of past experience, but it has trouble with the feeling of pastness and the immediacy of the past.  

The outcome of our discussion of the subjective and objective proposals seems to be the following. On the one hand, the past state of the world must have some kind of involvement in the intentional objects of memory. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why our memories enjoy a feeling of pastness and why they allow us to establish an immediate cognitive contact with the past. On the other hand, our past experience must also be involved in the intentional objects of memory in some way. Otherwise, it is hard to explain why our memories enjoy a feeling of past experience and why they afford an immediate cognitive contact with our past experience. The upshot, then, seems to be that somehow our episodic memories are simultaneously about two domains, the past state of the world and our past experience. The question that naturally arises at this point is how those two domains are involved in the intentional objects of memory precisely.

A straightforward way of construing the intentional object of an episodic memory as a combination of the past state of the world and our past experience is by conjoining the two elements. Consider again the case in which, in W0, I seem to perceive my house keys being in the door by having P and, minutes later, I have episodic memory M, which I would express by saying that I remember my house keys being in the door. The thought is that perhaps the following candidate for the intentional object of M could overcome the challenges of OBJ as well as those of SUBJ:

O&S: {W: In W, I correctly perceived that my house keys were in the door by having P}

Admittedly, if the intentional object of M is O&S, then it does make sense for M to enjoy both a feeling of pastness and a feeling of past experience. For what I am remembering, by having my memory, is both the world and my past experience of it. Similarly, one can see why M would put me in a position to form, without the need to perform any inference, beliefs about the past location of the keys and beliefs about my past perceptual experience of them if the intentional object of M is O&S. After all, M is providing me with information about both of those subject matters at the same time. Why should we not embrace, then, O&S as the intentional object of M? 

What this new proposal seems to miss is a further phenomenological feature of our episodic memories. Part of the phenomenology of remembering episodically seems to be the feeling that the mental state that we are undergoing originates in our own past experiences, as opposed to testimony or reasoning.​[8]​  If we remember some state of affairs episodically, then the question of whether we remember it because we have experienced that state of affairs in the past or we remember it for some other reason is no longer open for us. In virtue of the fact that we are having an episodic memory, it will seem to us that the relevant state of affairs has been experienced by us in the past, and it will seem to us that this is the reason why we are now remembering it. When I episodically remember my house keys in the door by having M, for example, it thereby seems to me that the location of the keys has been experienced by me in the past, and that this is why I am now remembering it. The trouble for the proposal according to which the intentional object of M is O&S is that the proposal is silent on the causal origin of M. If the proposal is right, then my memory M is about a correct episode of perception in the past; my past perception of my house keys being in the door. But if this is what M is about, then M is neutral on its own causal origin, which makes it difficult to explain why, in virtue of having M, it seems to me that my memory comes from experiencing the house keys in the past. It seems, then, that what we need as the intentional object of our episodic memories is not only a combination of the past state of the world and our past experience, but a combination that links both elements to our episodic memories in the right way.

5.	Self-reference in episodic memory

In light of the fact that memories convey the feeling that we remember some state of affairs because we have experienced that state of affairs in the past, it seems that the simplest way of combining the past state of the world with our own past experience in the intentional objects of our episodic memories is by identifying the intentional object of an episodic memory with its own causal history. On this approach, memories are self-referential. They are about themselves. In particular, they are about their own origin, which involves both a past perceptual experience and an objective state of affairs.​[9]​ What does this mean for the case in which I have episodic memory M minutes after seeming to perceive my house keys in the door by having P? The suggestion is that the intentional object of M is the following proposition (where ‘SR’ stands for ‘self-reference’):   

SR: 	{W: In W, I have M because I correctly perceived that my house keys were in the
door by having P}

If the intentional object of M is SR, then one can see why, in virtue of having M, I have the feeling that I am remembering the keys in the door because I have perceived them to be there, and not for some other reason. One would expect M to carry such a phenomenal feature, since part of the information that it conveys to me when I have it is precisely where M is coming from. Furthermore, it is also not surprising that M enjoys a feeling of pastness and affords an immediate cognitive contact with the past. If a correct past perception of my house keys being in the door is part of the intentional object of M, then it seems natural for M to produce a feeling that, in the past, my house keys were in the door, since the past perception being correct requires the keys to have been there. Likewise, it seems reasonable that I can form, on the basis of M, the belief that my house keys were in the door without performing any inference if the intentional object of M is SR. For the fact that my house keys were in the door is, once again, part of what M is informing me of when it informs me that I correctly perceived the keys to be there. Finally, if the intentional object of M is SR, then it makes sense that M elicits an awareness of what it was like to have P in the past. After all, P is part of what M represents on the self-referential approach. And, for the same reason, it is no wonder that M puts me in a position to form, on its basis, beliefs about what it was like for me to have P in the past. 

Perhaps a challenge for the self-referential view could arise from the fact that, according to the view, memories are ‘token reflexive’, that is, they are a constitutive part of their own intentional objects. The self-referential view predicts, in virtue of this aspect of it, that an episodic memory cannot accurately represent a possible situation in which that very memory is not taking place. If part of what an episodic memory represents is that the memory itself has a certain causal history, then the memory cannot accurately represent a possible situation in which the memory never takes place. For, in that situation, the memory does not have any causal history whatsoever. Consider, for example, a possible situation in which my house keys are in the door and, by having P (that is, the very same perceptual experience that I have in W0), I perceive the keys to be there. However, in this possible situation, I quickly forget about my house keys. Is my memory M, in W0, accurately representing this possible situation?​[10]​ If our pre-theoretic intuitions are that M is accurately representing it, then this type of scenario presents a challenge for the self-referential view, since the view commits us to the claim that M, in W0, is not correctly presenting such a possible situation.

A different challenge for the self-referential view might arise from the fact that, according to the view, the causal link between past experience and memory is also a constitutive part of the intentional object of a memory. The self-referential view predicts, in virtue of this aspect of it, that an episodic memory cannot accurately represent a possible situation in which that very memory takes place, and a correct past perception of the relevant objective state of affairs takes place in the past, but the two are not causally linked. If part of what an episodic memory represents is that the memory itself has a certain causal history, then the memory cannot accurately represent a possible situation in which the memory did not have that causal history.
Consider, for example, a possible situation in which my house keys are in the door and, by having P (that is, the very same perceptual experience that I have in W0), I perceive the keys to be there. Furthermore, in this possible situation, I have M (that is, the very same episodic memory that I have in W0). However, I do not have M because I had P. Instead, in this possible situation, it turns out that, shortly after having P, I forgot about my seeing the keys in the door, and M is now the product of my imagination. Is M, in W0, accurately representing this possible situation?​[11]​ If our pre-theoretic intuitions are that M is accurately representing it, then this type of scenario presents a challenge for the self-referential view too, since the view commits us to the claim that M, in W0, is not correctly presenting such a situation. And yet, it is hard to see how we could take care of the intuition that memories wear, so to speak, their origin on their sleeves if we did not build those memories, with their causal histories, into their own intentional objects. 

An option might be to locate the reflexivity of episodic memories at the level of their phenomenology, rather than at the level of their content. There are various ways of doing this. According to some of these strategies, an episodic memory is reflexive in that a subject who has it has the feeling that they themselves experienced whatever is being remembered. According to other phenomenological strategies, an episodic memory is reflexive in that a subject who has it has the feeling that the memory itself originates in some experience in the past. And, according to yet another kind of phenomenological strategy, an episodic memory is reflexive in that a subject who has it has the feeling that the memory itself originates in an experience that they themselves had in the past.​[12]​ The three strategies differ, then, in the degree of reflexivity that the build into the phenomenology of episodic memory. What is common to all three strategies is the contention that the phenomenology of an episodic memory is not determined by, and does not determine, its content. If a relation of dependence between the phenomenology of a memory and its content did hold in either direction, then the reflexivity involved in the phenomenology of that memory (whether this concerns a reference to the memory itself, a reference to its subject, or a reference to both) would be reflected in the content of that memory. If the relation of dependence grounds phenomenology on content, then it would be reflected because something in the content of the memory would need to be responsible for the relevant self-reflexive aspect of the phenomenology of that memory. And if the relation of dependence grounds content on phenomenology, then it would be reflected because the memory would then represent either itself, or its subject, or perhaps both, in virtue of the relevant self-reflexive aspect of its phenomenology. Proponents of the view that the self-reflexive character of episodic memory must be located at the level of phenomenology, but not at the level of content, are therefore committed to a form of separatism (the view that the phenomenal and intentional features of mental states are independent from each other). Whether this is too high a price to pay for an account of the reflexivity of episodic memory or not, however, is an issue that would take us far beyond the scope of this aspect to pursue.​[13]​        

The conclusion to draw from our discussion in this chapter might be that our folk notion of memory encompasses different ideas about what memories do, and those ideas motivate different views about the intentional objects of episodic memory. On the one hand, we think that memory is, in a certain sense, analogous to perception. Just like perception gives us knowledge of the present, it seems that memory should give us knowledge of the past. And this intuitive idea motivates the objective proposal about the intentional objects of memory. On the other hand, we think that memory is, in a certain sense, analogous to introspection. Just like introspection gives us access to our present experiences, it seems that memory should give us access to our past experiences. And this intuitive idea motivates the subjective proposal about the intentional objects of memory. One is then naturally pushed towards some version of the self-referential view to relieve the tension between these conceptions of the intentional objects of memory. Adopting this approach seems reasonable, but the benefits of the self-referential view come at a cost; a cost that should be disclosed. Admittedly, the more we build into the intentional objects of episodic memory, the more phenomenal and epistemic features of episodic memories we will be able to illuminate. But it also seems that the more we build into the intentional objects of episodic memory, the more demanding it will be for a possible situation to qualify as being accurately represented by our memories. As a result, the self-referential view raises the bar for accuracy considerably high. Whether this aspect of the self-referential view is ultimately a problem will probably depend on our commitments elsewhere in the philosophy of memory.  
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^1	  The distinction is introduced in Endel Tulving (1972). The distinction has undergone a number of revisions since then, but nothing in the discussion that follows hinges, as far as I can see, on the exact details of how we distinguish episodic memory from semantic memory.
^2	  Here I am assuming that propositions are identical with states of affairs. In section 4, I will also introduce the assumption that propositions are identical with sets of possible worlds. Despite the fact that the two assumptions are convenient for expositional purposes, the present discussion of the intentional objects of memory does not hang on the nature of propositions. If propositions are not identical with states of affairs, then the question of whether the intentional objects of memory are mind-independent or not can be read as the question of whether those propositions which constitute the intentional objects of our memories concern, or are about, the objective world or not. Likewise, if propositions are not sets of possible worlds and instead they are, let us say, ordered pairs of properties and objects, then the question of whether the intentional objects of memory are mind-independent or not can be read as the question of whether the constituents of those propositions which are the intentional objects of our memories belong to the objective world or not.
^3	  Another way in which semantically remembered states of affairs may vary is temporally. Suppose that, on Monday, you make an appointment to see your doctor; an appointment for Thursday. Suppose that your belief that you will see your doctor on Thursday is preserved until, let us say, Wednesday. Then, on Wednesday, you are semantically remembering a future state of affairs (namely, that you will see your doctor on Thursday). By contrast, in the Columbus case, the remembered state of affairs is clearly in the past. 
^4	  Sen Cheng and Markus Werning (2016) have proposed an account of the nature of episodic memory which makes episodes their intentional objects. Episodes are, as Cheng and Werning construe them, series of events in temporal succession and, for that reason, Chen and Werning’s view constitutes an example of an events-based approach to episodic memory. In this particular version of the events-based approach, however, the intentional objects of episodic memories are temporally extended. This introduces the complication of determining how to individuate episodic memories. (Is the memory that the remembering subject is having when they remember the first event in the episode the same as the memory that the subject is having when they remember the last event in the episode?) Fortunately, this is not an issue that we will need to address here. Intentional objects of memory, for the purposes of this discussion, will not be construed as temporally extended entities such as episodes.    
^5	  It is sometimes argued that, since light takes some time to travel from the objects that we perceive to our sensory organs, perception is always perception of something in the past. Nonetheless, it remains true that perceived states of affairs appear to us, rightly or wrongly, to be in the present. 
^6	  There is a strong representationalist view on consciousness according to which the phenomenal features of our mental states are intentional features of those states. This is the view put forward, for example, in Fred Dretske (1995). The point that the phenomenology of our episodic memories is the way in which we experience their intentional objects is congenial to this view, but it does not entail it. It is consistent with the possibility that the phenomenology of our episodic memories supervenes on their intentionality, even though the phenomenal features of our episodic memories are distinct from their intentional features.
^7	  Some expressions of this view can be found, for instance, in Alexius Meinong (1973, 256) and Wolfgang Von Leyden (1961, 61).
^8	  This feature is highlighted, for example, in Aristotle (1972, 69), John Locke (1975, 83), and William James (1890, 648-652). If we accept that mental states which originate in episodes of imagination, testimony or reasoning can qualify as memories, then we should grant that it is possible for this phenomenology to be misleading. Nonetheless, it remains true that episodic memories appear to us, rightly or wrongly, to originate in our own past experiences. 
^9	  The earliest version of this view is, to my knowledge, that in John Searle (1983, 85). However, the version of the view presented here differs from Searle’s in some details. For discussion of the relevant differences, see Fernández (2006). 
^10	  To be precise, the question is not whether M is true in that possible situation. (Since M never takes place in that situation, the answer to that question is obviously in the negative.) The question is whether M is true of that possible situation.
^11	  The question, once again, is not whether M is true when it takes place in this possible situation. (Since M, in this possible situation, is the product of my imagination, the question to that answer is likely to be in the negative.) The question is rather whether M, in W0, is true of that possible situation. 
^12	  Examples of, at least, the first kind of strategy can be found in Klein and Nichols (2012) and Michaelian (2016). 
^13	  For a relevant discussion, see Horgan and Tienson (2002).
